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 Republic of Moldova 
The Year 2015 in Politics 
 
ARMAND GOȘU 
 
 
 Nothing will be the same from now on. 2015 is not only a lost, failed 
year, it is a loop in which Moldova is stuck without hope. It is the year of the 
“theft of the century”, the defrauding of three banks, the Savings Bank, 
Unibank, and the Social Bank, a theft totaling one billion dollars, under the 
benevolent gaze of the National Bank, the Ministry of Finance, the General 
Prosecutor's Office, the National Anti-Corruption Council, and the Security and 
Intelligence Service (SIS). 2015 was the year when controversial oligarch Vlad 
Plakhotniuk became Moldova's international brand, identified by more and 
more chancelleries as a source of evil
1
. But 2015 is also the year of budding hope that civil society is awakening, that 
the political scene is evolving not only for the worse, but for the better too, that 
in the public square untarnished personalities would appear, new and 
charismatic figures around which one could build an alternative to the present 
political parties.  
 After a tense political campaign, the result of the parliamentary 
elections on 30 November 2014 was surprising, considering that the 
population's anger at the political class had reached alarming rates. The 
elections were won by the Party of Socialists (SPRM) by 20.5% (25 seats), with 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPM) right behind them, 20.1% (23 seats), the 
Party of Communists (PCRM), 17.4% (21 seats), the Democratic Party (DPM) 
– 15.8% (19), and the Liberal Party (LP) with 9.6% and 13 deputies. 
Calculations on paper indicated a wide majority of 55 out of 101 votes for a 
new “pro-European” coalition between LDPM-DPM-LP, which had been 
modified several times in the previous five years.  
                                                 
1 
 The Republic of Moldova seems to be in a profound depression, if judged by what the 
polls show. For the question “How much you trust the following institutions?”, the figures 
are depressing. 66% do not trust the government at all, 24% do not really trust it. 67% do 
not trust Parliament at all, and 25% do not really trust it. 77% do not trust President 
Timofti at all, while 16% do not really trust him. 56% do not trust the justice system at all, 
while 27% do not really trust it. 60% of respondents do not trust at all political parties, 
and 27% do not really trust them. Only 11% have some trust in political parties. The 
Church is in the top position in terms of trust, with 38% of respondents having a lot of 
trust, and 36% only moderate trust. Please, see Public Opinion Barometer, Republic of 
Moldova, November 2015, p. 35. 
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 The Stolen Billion – Delayed Reaction Explosion 
 
 This time, however, the dynamic was different, and it was caused by the 
public announcement that Moldavian banks were missing no more and no less 
than a billion dollars. Right away, the Moldovan leu plummeted, going down by 
30%, prices went up accordingly, the predictable result being the dramatic 
impoverishment of the population. According to World Bank figures, the per 
capita GDP fell from 2.238 to 1.740 US dollars, and Moldova secured its 
position as the poorest country in Europe. Under public opinion pressure, the 
Speaker of Parliament Adrian Candu published the report issued by the 
company (Kroll) which investigated the case. This, however, was recently 
contradicted  by the General Prosecutor's Office and the NAC, when they 
indicted former PM Vlad Filat.  
 Whoever counted on the idea that Moldova's cauldron would not boil 
over was sorely mistaken. At least by half. In spite of the winter cold, groups of 
hundreds of young people coagulated first on social media, and then gathered in 
the Grand National Assembly Square2. An initiative group formed, which went 
on to form the Justice and Truth Civic Dignity Platform (JTCDP). The first 
major protest took place on 22 February 2015, under the slogan “We want the 
Leu back!”. Calls for unification with Romania were heard right from the first 
large-scale JTCDP rally. However, the unionist message was more a diversion 
to obscure the main demand of the protesters, which was to conduct 
investigations into the plunder of banks, find the culprits, punish them and 
recover the billion dollars3. The April 8 rally brought over 20.000 people to the 
square. One month later, on May 3, about 20,000 participants gathered again4. 
Rallies against the current political class had become a social phenomenon. 
Fairly early on, controversial oligarch Vlad Plakhotniuk, DPM's backer, became 
the epitome of evil for protesters. It was also the crowd’s reaction to the 
manipulation perpetrated by the oligarch controlled press and directed against 
the JTCDP. It is also true that the leaders of the Platform did not manage to 
send a coherent message. The clarification came as late as the 7 June rally, 
when the LP, campaigning in Chișinău, managed to hijack the JTCDP rally 
where people were calling for an investigation into the theft of a billion dollars, 
                                                 
2 
 http://www.platzforma.md/un-interviu-cu-inga-grigoriu-si-liviu-vovc-despre-orasul-
demnitatii-platforma-da-si-planurile-de-viitor-ale-protestatarilor/ (accessed 5 Jan. 2016).  
3  http://petrunegura.blogspot.ro/2015/02/scrisoare-deschisa-dlui-nicolae-josan.html 
(accessed 5 Jan. 2016). 
4  http://www.platzforma.md/despre-o-manifestatie-de-protest-cu-demnitate-adevar-si-
cintece/ (accessed 5 Jan. 2016). 
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turning it into a support rally for Dorin Chirtoacă, nephew to LP chairman 
Mihai Ghimpu, who was running for one more term as mayor of Chișinău5. The 
result was dramatic: thousands started to shout “Shame!” at Chirtoacă and 
Ghimpu. Cars and buses came into the square with flags and posters, which 
increased the confusion, while Ghimpu was claiming that the protesters who did 
not support his nephew Chirtoacă were “Moscow's agents”6. The message was 
immediately echoed by other Liberal leaders, who declared that the JTCDP was 
“with Putin”7 On September 6, two rallies were held in the center of 
Chișinău, one with over 50.000 people involved, in the Grand Assembly 
Square, by the Platform, where they spoke only Romanian, while the second 
meeting, the Russian speaking one, led by former communist Grigore Petrenko, 
was held in front of the Science Academy, and was attended by a few hundred 
people8. Fear [was] spread that the two protests might clash. An obvious piece 
of manipulation, as both protests were against the kleptocratic political class and 
oligarch Plakhotniuk. There is no doubt that the calls were for recovering the 
stolen billion. That this was done in Romanian or Russian was secondary. A 
maximum of 30 protesters, led by Petrenko, passed by Plakhotniuk's house, 
Nobil Hotel, Plakhotniuk’s headquarter, then by the General Prosecutor's Office 
headquarters, heading for the National Bank. Near the Prosecutor's Office, they 
were attacked by about 80 to 100 policemen, including special forces. The 
epilogue to this story: Petrenko and a few other protest leaders that were in front 
of Plakhotniuk's house have now been in jail for a few months. This is a sign 
that the oligarch, who is said to control the justice system in Moldova, is afraid 
of protesters, and tries to root out any protest aimed at him personally. After the 
grand protest on September 6, JTCDP protesters occupied the square, setting up 
a tent camp. Shortly after, it was replicated by another tent camp, a few hundred 
meters away, in front of Parliament. The second camp was organized by the 
pro-Russian parties, SPRM and Our Party, chaired by the mayor of Bălți, the no 
less controversial Renato Usatyi9. If the platform camp used exclusively the 
Romanian language in speeches, posters, and slogans, the rallies organized by 
Igor Dodon and Usatyi were bilingual. In terms of demands, the socialists 
followed to the letter the platform's agenda. Between the first rally in February 
and September, demands have evolved from investigation of the billion dollar 
theft and changing the managers of the institutions responsible with supervision 
                                                 
5  http://www.platzforma.md/racul-broasca-si-stiuca-sau-mitingurile-din-piata-marii-
dezbinari-nationale/ (accessed 5 Jan. 2016). 
6  Interview with Igor Boțan, Chișinău, September 2015.  
7  Interview with Petru Negură, Chișinău, September 2015.   
8  http://www.platzforma.md/demisia-bun-si-ce-facem-mai-departe/ (accessed 5 Jan. 2016).  
9  http://ava.md/analytics-commentary/032564-analiticheskii-doklad-renato-usatii-put-ot-
inzhenera-kombinata-pitaniya-mzhd-do-vozmozhnogo-kandidata-na-post-prezidenta-
moldovi.html (accessed 10 Jan. 2016).  
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and control of banks to demanding the resignation of the general prosecutor and 
the heads of NAC and SIS. The lack of reaction from the powers that be in 
Chișinău, who were not impressed by the greatest wave of protests in the last 
two decades, radicalized the mob that in September demanded the resignation of 
the government, along with the PM, the resignation of President Nicolae 
Timofti, and early elections10. A new rally, starting on October 4th, confirmed 
civil society's capacity to mobilize tens of thousands of people, which spread 
well beyond Chișinău, in fact spreading all over the country. Now, with a real 
danger of protests getting out of hand, the press controlled by the oligarch, 
brandished the threat that the 7 April 2009 scenario might be repeated. The 
greatest danger that was publicly circulated was a Ukrainian type evolution, 
which all of society feared. The social tension accumulated, also because of the 
way in which the media controlled by oligarch Plakhotniuk depicted the 
demonstrations organized by the platform, and the continuous attacks against its 
leaders, especially slander directed against Andrei Năstase, the chairman of the 
Grand National Assembly Council11.  
 Tens of thousands of people in the streets were exerting great pressure 
on the leaders of the governing coalition, who were asked for minimal 
concessions. Hence the need for an outlet to reduce popular pressure, the least 
of which was to fabricate a guilty party.  
 The manipulation of protesters by introducing the theme of union with 
Romania, breaking up the mass of protesters into Romanian and Russian 
speakers, which resulted in two protests instead of a single one, the campaign of 
demonizing the JTCDP run by the Plakhotniuk controlled media, allowed the 
“pro-European” coalition in Chișinău to hold on to power in spite of the 
emotions raised by the huge protests, the biggest in the last two decades. 
Lacking a decisive reaction from those in power, the civic platform could either 
self-dissolve, or – seduced by the figures yielded by opinion polls – turn into a 
political party. Which is precisely what happened. As long as Plakhotniuk's 
whole media machinery was attacking the new party and its leader, the chances 
of this political construction grew. The main argument for a large part of 
Moldovan voters and public opinion was that Andrei Năstase and his team 
could not be bought by the oligarch. Considering that the latest opinion poll 
revealed the worst score for Plakhotniuk (85% do not trust him at all and 7% 
not really), establishing distance from the oligarch is proof of political 
intelligence for any party or politician.  
 Politically, 2015 was a nightmare year which turned the Republic of 
Moldova from a “success story” into a failure of the Eastern Partnership and the 
                                                 
10  Interview with Arcadie Barbăroșie, Chișinău, September 2015.   
11  Interview with Igor Boțan, Chișinău, September 2015.  
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European Neighborhood Policy12. Only now did it become obvious that the 
“success story” sold in Brussels, Berlin, Paris, Washington or Bucharest was 
just window dressing for a lot of dirt, a lack of will to carry out reforms 
demanded by the EU, and, most of all, a rejection of any attempt to start the 
fight against high level corruption.  
 As the LDPM had the highest number of votes of all pro-European 
parties, the position of prime minister went to it, while that of Speaker of 
Parliament went to the DPM. The wrong calculation on the part of Liberal-
Democrat leader Vlad Filat, who forgot that Moldova is a parliamentary 
republic. In fact, Filat was not holding a single card, because the appointment of 
Iurie Leancă, the incumbent PM, was imposed.  
 Iurie Leancă is maybe the most highly educated, cultured, likable and 
empathetic political man in Chișinău. He definitely is, if not the only, then one 
of the very few Moldovan politicians with whom Western leaders have a dialog. 
He certainly was the best foreign minister in the short history of the Republic of 
Moldova. He became PM on 31 May 2013, as a compromise solution after the 
Pădurea Domnească scandal, which led to the break-up of the Alliance for 
European Integration ruling coalition. Iurie Leancă continued, even more 
successfully, to consolidate Moldova's brand name as the “valedictorian of the 
Eastern Partnership”. It was not just a PR operation, the Filat and Leancă 
governments achieved important reforms, taking great strides in bringing 
Moldova closer to Europe. However, the reforms – such as they were – proved 
not to be enough to bring Moldova to the tipping point that put it irreversibly on 
a European trajectory.  
 At the top of the LDPM, Filat, as chairman of the most important party 
in the pro-European coalition in Chișinău, had his pride hurt by the fact that he 
was overshadowed by the PM, which generated a constant tension in the 
relationship with premier Leancă. The latter, in the end, abandoned the LDPM, 
after nominating President Nicolae Timofti for a new term, and was rejected by 
Parliament on 12 February 2015. Leancă formed his own Christian Democratic 
political body, the European Popular Party of Moldova.  
 An obscure businessman, Chiril Gaburici, who had behind him the 
LDPM, was appointed head of the government, for reasons that are still not 
clear. He was a sort of technocratic premier heading a political government of a 
                                                 
12 
 Corina Rebegea, „No Country for Oligarchs”, www.cepa.org/content/no-country-
oligarchs, (accessed 29 Jan. 2016); Anna Nemtsova, „Inside the Uprising Against 
Moldova’s Donald Trump”, www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/01/27/inside-the-
uprising-against-moldova-s-donald-trump.html , (accessed 28 Jan. 2016); Natalia Otel 
Belan,Marc Schleifer, „Moldova’s pro-Western Facade”, www.politico.eu/article/ 
moldovas-pro-western-facade-protest-chisinau-russia-ukeaine/, (accessed 30 Jan. 2016); 
Stanislav Secrieru, „Moldova: between Tough Love and a Popcorn Strategy”, 
https://blog.pism.pl/blog/?p=1&id_blog=44&id_post=758#, (accessed 22 Feb. 2016).  
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minority coalition. However, his ministers were controlled by leaders of the 
parties. Shortly after taking over governance, a journalistic investigation 
brought to light irregularities with the premier's school records, more precisely 
the fact that there was no high school diploma in them13. However, this detail 
did not bring to an end Gaburici's short political career. What was fatal to him, 
however, was the fact that, on June 6th, he demanded the resignation of the 
entire leadership of the General Prosecutor's Office and the National Bank, 
under accusation of tolerating the theft of the billion dollars from Moldovan 
banks. In a letter to Timofti and Candu, PM Gaburici announced that he would 
resign if he was not granted satisfaction:  
 
 „Moldova is smothered by corruption, its financial system is bleeding. And 
the price is paid by every citizen, but  not by the guilty. After yesterday's meeting of the 
National Committee for Financial Stability, I realized that the entire  financial  system 
of the Republic of Moldova is under siege, and that several financial institutions are in 
danger. The government lacks leverage, and the relevant institutions hesitate in solving 
these problems. […] I don't want to stand by and  see interest groups destroy the 
country. And I don't negotiate with anyone our children's well-being and future”14.  
 
 The poignancy of the letter did not impress the president of the country, 
the Parliament and the leaders of the parties, who refused to dismiss the General 
Prosecutor and the head of the National Bank, so that Gaburici resigned on the 
12th of June15. After that, he refused even to appoint an interim premier until a 
new government was sworn in16.  
 On July the 23rd, when Maia Sandu was nominated as PM17, and it 
seemed that the sun was finally rising on Moldova's street, Liberal leader Mihai 
Ghimpu gave an interview to PRO TV Chișinău in which he critised her 
candidacy18. Mrs. Sandu, Minister of Education, with an excellent professional 
reputation, thanks to her significant achievements in reforming the system, also 
had a very good public image which she did not want to sacrifice on the altar of 
political scheming in Chișinău. Therefore, she publicly presented several 
                                                 
13  http://www.zdg.md/editia-print/investigatii/cv-ul-necenzurat-al-premierului (accessed 12 
Jan. 2016).  
14  http://www.trm.md/ro/politic/chiril-gaburici-cere-demisia-conducerii-pg-bnm-si-cnpf/ 
(accessed 15 Jan. 2016).  
15   http://unimedia.info/stiri/video-ultima-ora-gaburici-si-a-anuntat-demisia-95570.html 
(accessed 15 Jan. 2016).  
16  http://inprofunzime.md/stiri/politic/chiril-gaburici-refuz-sa-asigur-interimatul-functiei-de-
premier---1007231.html (accessed 15 Jan. 2016).  
17  http://www.pldm.md/stiri/8774-maia-sandu-candidat-la-functia-de-premier (accessed 12 
Jan. 2016).  
18  http://inprofunzime.md/stiri/politic/mihai-ghimpu-la-in-profunzime.html (accessed 12 
Jan. 2016); http://www.ziarulnational.md/mihai-ghimpu-nu-faceti-din-maia-sandu-erou-
nu-este-ea-mai-desteapta-ca-noi/ (accessed 12 Jan. 2016).  
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conditions in order to accept the position of PM (among them, changing the 
prosecutor general and the governor of the National Bank). As the DPM and LP 
announced they would not vote for Maia Sandu, LDPM proposed another 
candidate for PM, Valeriu Streleț. The new government was endorsed by the 
Parliament on 30 of July19.  
 The long political crisis in Chișinău, the more and more obvious 
oligarchic control over state institutions, and the failure to reform caused 
international financial institutions to suspend relations with the Republic of 
Moldova, blocking financing, without which the country was risking collapse. 
Romania was the only country which, in an unclear political game which 
sparked mistrust in Brussels and Washington, promised its eastern neighbor a 
loan, the first installment of which (60 million EUR was claimed to help 
Moldova make it through the winter.  
 As the protests spread and grew, and the economic situation worsened, 
the coalition decided, on 14 of October, to ask for the resignation of the general 
prosecutor, one of the most important demands made by the protesters. 
However, the following day, October 15, on the first day of the parliamentary 
session, General Prosecutor Corneliu Gurin addressed Parliament to call for 
immunity to be lifted for LDPM chairman Vlad Filat. Parliament voted with a 
wide majority to lift Filat's immunity, who was accused of defrauding the 
Savings Bank20. A sad but predictable end to one who may be the most talented 
Moldovan politician. His decline had started a while back, in the spring of 2013, 
when the Constitutional Court had issued that strange ruling barring Filat from 
taking the prime ministerial chair. As PM Streleț acted decently and did not 
distance himself from his former party chairman, Filat, who supported him and 
promoted him to the position of premier, and opted to let justice run its course, 
the DPM, together with the communists and the socialists voted on 29 October 
a censure motion that brought down the government21. 
 Since both Brussels and Bucharest said that the resumption of financial 
aid to the Republic of Moldova hinged on a pro-European government taking 
power, the DPM tried to disrupt the PDLM faction in Parliament, and when it 
became obvious that this attempt had failed, they announced negotiations with 
the LDPM. However, the latter said they would take part in government on 
certain conditions: depoliticizing some institutions, and changing the Prosecutor 
General and the head of anti-corruption, considered to be Plakhotniuk's men. 
Both the LP and the DPM categorically rejected LDPM's conditions.  
                                                 
19 
 http://www.agerpres.ro/externe/2015/07/30/alerta-republica-moldova-are-un-nou-guvern-
premierul-desemnat-valeriu-strelet-primeste-votul-de-incredere-al-parlamentului-17-20-
22 (accessed 12 Jan. 2016).  
20  http://www.agerpres.ro/externe/2015/10/15/alerta-republica-moldova-ridicarea-imunitatii-
lui-vlad-filat-votata-in-parlamentul-de-la-chisinau-16-26-41 (accessed 12 Jan. 2016).  
21  http://www.dw.com/ro/guvernul-streleţ-a-căzut-ce-urmează/a-18815067 (accessed 12 Jan. 2016).  
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 The fact that both the Gaburici and Streleț governments were brought 
down by the DPM, controlled by Plakhotniuk, when they called for the 
prosecutor general and the head of anti-corruption to be changed, cannot be by 
chance. Also, Maia Sandu, nominated for prime minister, was rejected by the 
DPM and LP for her demand for the general prosecutor and head of anti-
corruption to be changed. The heads of the two institutions are considered loyal 
to Plakhotniuk, through whom the controversial oligarch controls the justice 
system in the Republic of Moldova.  
 
 
 PCRM - Controlled Implosion 
 
 Even a superficial analysis of the political situation in Chișinău in 2015 
would place at the top of the list of major events the dissolution of the PCRM, a 
party that has long been dominant on the political scene in Chișinău. Without 
PCRM's controlled dissolution, many of the political games in 2015, from the 
Gaburici cabinet getting voted in to Chirtoacă's election as mayor of Chișinău, 
ending with Plakhotniuk's attempt to craft for himself a parliamentary majority, 
would not have been possible. The number of seats held by the communists had 
been constantly dropping: 71 deputy seats (2001), 56 (2005), 60 (April 2009), 
48 (July 2009), 42 (2010) and 21 (2014). After the 14 deputies left for the 
Social-Democratic platform, Vladimir Voronin's PCRM had only 7 deputies 
left. The grand party that dominated the political scene is only a shadow of its 
former self. Less than two years ago, the PCRM was the apparent winner in 
parliamentary elections.  
 How could the PCRM, the formerly large and powerful party, end up 
the shadow of today? A meeting that never happened apparently sealed the fate 
of Moldovan communists. On 21 May 2014, in the Chișinău office of 
businessman Emmanuil Grinshpun, the president of the Jewish Congress of 
Moldova, a Russian billionaire, Oleg Boyko, the head of Finstar Financial 
Group, was waiting for Voronin. The leader of the communists came in a car, 
stopped in front of the building for a few minutes, then left and didn't look back. 
Voronin and Boiko were supposed to shake hands on the conditions negotiated 
in Moscow by Mark Tkachuk, the ideologue of Moldovan communists, in order 
for Russia to help in the upcoming election campaign. The fundamental issues 
were two: the election campaign was run under the slogan of fighting against 
the oligarchs and Moldova joining the Eurasian Union. That same evening, 
Voronin gave an interview on the Moldova 1 channel, in which he said that his 
country could not join the Eurasian Union, because that does not exist. More 
than that, he reiterated his favorite thesis of the lamb suckling two sheep. 
Voronin had flipped again, after a few years of saying that Moldova needs to 
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turn to the East and join the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union22. The 
following day, on the 22nd, Tkachuk sent a letter to the PCRM Politburo in 
which he insisted that without support from Moscow, the chances for Moldovan 
communists in the elections get slimmer. In a dramatic gesture, Tkachuk 
announced he would resign his parliamentary seat. As late as 6 June, the 
ideologue of the communists held a press conference in which he blamed 
Plakhotniuk for the situation in the PCRM, as he allegedly had bought Voronin 
and had prepared a coalition between communists and democrats. The Tkachuk 
group was blocking this collaboration with the DPM, reason for which Grigore 
Petrenco, Iurie Muntean, Alexandru Petkov, Zurab Todua, which the press had 
dubbed “the Taliban”, were removed, as the first step made by the PCRM 
Central Committee Plenary Session on 7 June23. After the Plenary, the PCRM 
leadership abandoned their policy of integrating Moldova into the Eurasian 
Union and their critical tone towards the establishment and they resumed a 
balanced, pro-European rhetoric. Another team formed around Voronin, headed 
by Artur Reshetnikov, who left the party on 21 December 2015, joining 
Plakhotniuk's Social Democratic Platform. What the “communist Taliban” did 
not understand, and still don't to this day, was that Voronin's change of direction 
was due less to the bags of dollars they believed the communist leader got from 
Plakhotniuk, and more to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which was in a 
volatile stage. Crimea's annexation, the mockery of a referendum organized 
there by the Russians in March 2014, the destabilization of Donbass in April-
May 2015, the launch of the Novorossia project, had a major impact on 
Voronin. It was a sort of Kozak Memorandum, 2014 edition, which caused the 
communist leader to turn to the West. For a Moldovan patriot, as Voronin 
thinks of himself, the priority was the country's stability and the avoidance of a 
Ukrainian type scenario.  
 The Kremlin did not regret the PCRM defection. Vladimir Putin did not 
trust Voronin, and found quickly in the SPRM, led by Igor Dodon and Zinaida 
Grechannyi, the ideal instrument to promote Russian interests in Moldova. 
Various combinations that culminated with Renato Usatyi abandoning the 
election race raised the percentage for Socialists from 1 to 21%, turning the 
party supported by Putin into the unexpected winner of the 30 November 2014 
elections. The vanity of the Kremlin leader, whose photo had been spread all 
over the Republic of Moldova by Grechannyi and Dodon, had been satisfied.  
 Brussels was happy, because a pro-European majority was taking 
shape, and Moscow was too, since the socialists supported by the Kremlin were 
leading. The PCRM turned from a leader of the opposition into a “hinge party”, 
                                                 
22 
 http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/vladimir-voronin-bolshe-ne-lev-kak-partiya-
kommunistov-utratila-identichnost-i-oka-21028 (accessed 30 Dec. 2015).  
23  http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/delo-antifa-rezist-mif-o-popytke-gosperevorota-v-
moldove-11868 (accessed 30 Dec. 2015).  
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ready to support a pro-European government without getting anything in return. 
The PCRM hinge could be fixed by one man only, Plakhotniuk.  
 
 
 Plakhotniuk for Prime Minister 
 
 The most controversial public personality in Moldova is oligarch 
Vladimir Plakhotniuk24. Born in December 1965, probably (in other documents 
this appears as 1 January 1966, most likely it was registered in January), in 
Călărași raion of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, one of the 15 USSR 
republics. He obtained a degree in food engineering from Chișinău Technical 
University. A turning point in his career, according to himself, was supposed to 
have occurred in 2002 at Cotroceni Palace, where the then president of 
Romania, Ion Iliescu, introduced the future oligarch to the president of the 
Republic of Moldova, Vladimir Voronin, who was visiting Bucharest, in the 
following words: “May I introduce to you my friend, representing Romanian 
business from Moldova”25. President Iliescu's “friend”, Plakhotniuk, was at that 
point an obscure Moldovan businessman who had arrived in Bucharest under 
conditions that are still not very clear. In 2002 he was invited to the delegation 
of Romanian businessmen, called to meet the president of Moldova, and the 
delegation of Moldovan businessmen who accompanied him to Romania; 
Plakhotniuk had just been appointed to Petrom Moldova, the branch of the most 
important Romanian oil company26. According to several sources, Plakhotniuk 
was personally supported by various government ministers in the Adrian 
                                                 
24 
 The personalities enjoying the most confidence (free response) in the Republic of 
Moldova, according to the Barometer of the Republic of Moldova. November 2015, p. 37, 
are the following: Renato Usatyi ‒ 11%; Igor Dodon ‒ 6 %; Maia Sandu ‒ 5 %; Vladimir 
Voronin ‒ 4 %; Iurie Leancă ‒ 4 %; Andrei Năstase ‒ 4 %; Marian Lupu ‒ 4 %. The 
margin of error is +- 3%. Recently, in February 2016, the CBS-AXA poll confirmed the 
ranking: Renato Usatyi – 11,5%; Igor Dodon – 7,7%; Andrei Năstase – 5%; Maia Sandu – 
4,6%; Marian Lupu – 2%. http://www.timpul.md/articol/sondaj-partidul-nostru---32-2-
psrm---20-3-da---13-5-pas---10-1-pdm---7-ppem---6-pcrm---5-2-pl---2-pldm---0-8-
88739.html (accessed 25 Feb. 2016). 
In the November 2015 barometer, according to responses to a closed question, how much 
do you trust the following political figures, Vlad Plakhotniuk is the figure with the least 
amount of trust, 80%, with 7% saying they do not really trust him. Only 2% trust is within 
the margin of error. President Timofti does not fare much better. 78% do not trust him at 
all, and 11% do not really trust him. Only 5% trust him. Usatyi fares best with this 
question, with 24% trusting him, and 13% trusting him very much. (Barometrul opiniei 
publice, cit., p. 38). The highest level of mistrust, according to the CBS-AXA poll, is 
engendered by the same Vlad Plakhotniuk, with 93%, followed by Filat and Ghimpu. 
25 
 http://unimedia.info/stiri/-19621.html (accessed 16 Dec. 2015).  
26  http://revista22.ro/60046/anticorupie-original-la-chiinu.html (accessed 15 Dec. 2015). 
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Năstase government27. Most likely, Plakhotniuk got Romanian citizenship in 
2002, when he was appointed director for Petrom Moldova. The double 
citizenship was revealed by the press as late as 2011. Starting in 2009, 
Plakhotniuk had another identity in Romania, under the name Vlad Ulinici28, 
with different ID documents that listed a different birth date, among other 
things. Becoming very influential in communist president Voronin's entourage, 
Plakhotniuk is believed by the authors of the 800-page long research 
Oligarkhicheskaya Moldova to be the godfather of Moldovan oligarchic 
capitalism, based on the control of the main financial flows. The bases of this 
mechanism were laid between 2005 and 2009, during the second communist 
governance. After April 2009, the time of the so-called Twitter revolution in 
Chișinău, the Alliance for European Integration (AEI), which ruled in Moldova 
since fall of 2009 until recently, not only did not dismantle the old financial 
structures, but developed them creatively29. The main oligarchs in the first year 
of AEI governance were Anatol Stati, Vladimir Plakhotniuk, the LDPM – Filat, 
the LP – Ghimpu, the CPRM – Voronin, and a discreet but very influential, with 
their own businesses representing Russian business in Romania (a group formed 
around the 1990s around Lukoil Romania30). In fact, the ranking of the richest 
Moldovan largely confirms this list31.  
 The philosophy of the oligarchs is very simple. They slice up Moldova 
to maximize profit from any activity. The jewels of the crown are: a) the 
Ministry of the Economy, which controls Moldova's entire industry and energy 
complex, issues certificates and licenses (for export and import), as well as the 
Agency for Public Property; b) Customs, which is under the Finance Ministry, 
bring in 70 to 75% of state revenue; c) the National Bank; d) the Ministry of 
Transportation (the biggest grants and loans received were aimed at the 
development of infrastructure32). How did Plakhotniuk succeed, within the 
space of only a few years, to eliminate or reduce the weight of the other 
oligarchs and grab hold of the Moldovan state? Obviously, not with help from 
                                                 
27  http://www.flux24.ro/cine-e-papusarul-de-la-chisinau-legatura-cu-psd-si-cosmin-gusa/ 
(accessed 16 Dec. 2015).  
28 
 http://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/vladimir-plahotniuc-oligarh-treilea-om-stat-dubla-
identitate-moldova-romania-1_50ad6e177c42d5a66394ff29/index.html (accessed 15 Dec. 
2015). 
29 
 Bogdan Țârdea, Victor Ciobanu, Олигархическая Молдова, Chișinău, 2013, pp. 605-606. 
30 
 Ibidem, pp. 618-621.  
31 
 The amount of assets remains a mystery, and data being vehiculated vary wildly. Forbes 
Russia claims that the assets of the richest Moldovans in 2010 were: Stati – $ 2.5 billion, 
Plahotniuc – $ 2 billion, Filat – $ 1.2 billion, Valeriu Păsat – $1 billion, Nicolae Ciornâi – 
$1 billion, Oleg Voronin – $ 0.7 billion. The most plausible figures offered in 2010 by 
Delo magazine in Kiev are: Anatol Stati – 500 million $, Vlad Plahotniuc – 300 million, 
Nicolae Ciornâi – 120 million.... Oleg Voronin – 70 million, Ion Sturza – 30 million, Vlad 
Filat – 30 million (tenth in the ranking). Ibidem, pp. 698-700.  
32 
 Ibidem, pp. 605-606.  
32 ARMAND GOȘU 
 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVI  no. 1  2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
various agencies, not even the Moldovan Customs. Plakhotniuk's key for 
success is – according to most commentators – control over the justice system. 
Former general prosecutors Valeriu Zubco (2009-2013) and Corneliu Gurin 
(2013-2016) were believed to be close associates of the controversial oligarch. 
Courts, commercial courts, the Center for Combating Economic Crime and 
Corruption (CCECC), the Supreme Council of Prosecutors, the Higher Council 
of Magistrates, and even the Constitutional Court, it is sometimes said, all these 
are supposed to be controlled by Plakhotniuk through various blackmail or 
corruption schemes.  
 Control over the judiciary33 allowed Plakhotniuk to secure his assets, to 
increase his wealth by hijacking businesses and legalizing the operations in 
courts, and to secure veritable networks which, using the banks and courts in 
Moldova, managed to launder for the Russian mafia over 20 billion dollars in 
only a few years34.  
 But what do Plakhotniuk's assets amount to? The controversial 
oligarch's wealth statements are extremely parsimonious with relevant 
information. Like the 2010 wealth statement, the first, or all the subsequent 
ones, talk nothing of the things that any child in Chișinău knows by heart by 
now. Those documents say nothing about the hotels, television stations, famous 
discos and bars, or even the jet that the notorious oligarch owns. There is 
mention of only two apartments he owns downtown Chișinău and 4 garages 
where he keeps his 3 Mercedes, the ones he lists as owning. The only company 
mentioned is Prime Management SRL. Most of the wealth is concentrated into a 
holding35 run by a Dutch off-shore company. It conceals the Prime TV, 2 Plus, 
Canal 3 and Publika TV television stations, the news portals, advertising 
agencies, the hotels Nobil and Codru, etc, while the luxurious jet that takes 
Plakhotniuk around is the property of Nobil Air.  
 One would not exaggerate to say that a single man controls an entire 
country, albeit small and the poorest in Europe on top of that. This is a well-
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 The accords that lay the basis of the AEI show the way in which the main institutions of 
the state are politically controlled. Moldovan Democrats controlled the general 
prosecutor's office as early as 2010, according to provisions in the agreement.  
34 
 http://jurnal.md/ro/justitie/2015/11/4/memoriu-spalari-de-mld-de-i-atacuri-raider-prin-
justi-ia-din-rm-1176356/ (accessed 15 Jan. 2016); http://jurnal.md/ro/economic/ 
2015/5/21/cronologic-cum-a-fost-jefuita-banca-statului-sau-reidman-paznic-la-bem/ 
(accessed 15 Dec. 2015). 
35 
 OTIV Prime Holding BV. Most likely, the acronym OTIV comes from the members of 
his family, Oxana, wife, Timofei and Inochentie, sons, and Vladimir. The holding 
comprises OTIV Prime Services BV, OTIV Prime Real Estate BV, OTIV Prime 
Hospitality BV, OTIV Prime Media BV, OTIV Prime Financial BV.  
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known fact among European commissioners and the Council of Europe36 
Secretary General, or senior officials with the State Department37. However, the 
international agenda is rife with cases, and Moldova is much too small, so that 
Chișinău is only on Bucharest's radar. However, it was Bucharest itself which 
launched Plakhotniuk into big business, in 2002, as we have shown above. His 
door to high level politics was the next step. The controversial character has 
emerged from the shadows, where he was running back door games, and 
climbed the political stage after 2009, when power was taken over by the 
communists. It is true that Plakhotniuk has played a positive role in several 
moments of crisis in the past, contributing to the formation of the AEI, the Vlad 
Filat government, and promoted a pro-European discourse. Plakhotniuk was 
also supposed to be the architect behind President Nicolae Timofti's election, on 
16 March 2012, after a long presidential hiatus of almost 3 years38, which kept 
generating political crises.  
 In time, however, relations between the two Vladimirs, Plakhotniuk and 
Filat, broke down blowing up the government coalition in February 2013, when 
the LDPM voted with the communists to dismiss Plakhotniuk as the deputy 
speaker of Parliament, and Lupu as President of the Republic of Moldova, while 
the DPM voted, also alongside the communists, to bring down the Filat 
government. This crisis ended up with Filat as a loser, who, to no avail, 
humiliated himself publicly by apologizing to Plakhotniuk in the hope of 
returning to his position as a premier. That was a useless gesture, since the 
Constitutional Court had decided that the man accused of corruption and 
convicted by no-confidence vote cannot be prime minister. Behind that 
decision, which brought quite an innovation to jurisprudence, was Alexandru 
Tănase, son of the late Constantin Tănase, who published the Timpul 
newspaper, a unionist publication partially financed from Bucharest. A talented 
politician and attorney, Al. Tănase had been one of Filat's fellow party 
members, but eventually became a personal adversary of the LDPM leader and 
resigned from the Constitutional Court. Hence the suspicions expressed by 
observers of the political scene in Chișinău that Plakhotniuk controls the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova. Filat's fall coincides with 
Romanian PM Victor Ponta's takeover of relations with Moldova, after the 
landslide victory of the Social-Liberal Union in the parliamentary elections of 
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 See Thorbjorn Jagland's in New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/ 
opinion/bring-moldova-back-from-the-brink.html?_r=1.  
37  Discussions in Brussels, Bucharest or Chișinău with two European Commissioners and 
foreign diplomats (September 2015).  
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 Judge and head of the Higher Council of Magistrates, a structure controlled by the 
controversial oligarch, N. Timofti was supposed to be “Plakhotniuk's man”, according to 
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the president, Nicu Timofti, had worked for Prime TV, Plakhotniuk's first TV station. 
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December 2012 in Romania. Filat and the LDPM were part of the European 
Popular Party. The former premier in Chișinău had been supported by President 
Traian Băsescu. The ally of the Romanian Social Democrats in Moldova is 
Lupu and Plakhotniuk's DPM, and both parties are in the Socialist International.  
 After the elections of November 2014, it had become obvious that Filat 
no longer controlled anything, he had become a shadow of what had been the 
most talented politician of his generation, with over 50% confidence in polls, 
but also, according to Chișinău gossip, one of the most corrupt. At Coalition 
meetings he was quiet, accepting almost anything he was asked. He was the 
ideal partner because he did not raise any issue. The people close to him said 
that he expected to be arrested, but at the beginning of the following year39.  
 In the summer of 2015, Plakhotniuk resigned from Parliament and 
announced he would retire from public life. The oligarch's negative image and 
his limited resources were the reasons invoked by close associates when asked 
to explain this decision. However, Plakhotniuk, far from the limelight, was 
preparing new strikes. Underground, he feels like a fish in the water, controlling 
from there informally state institutions, blackmail files, materials smearing his 
adversaries, “he's responsible for nothing while influencing everything”40.  
 In spite of the fact that in summer Plakhotniuk withdrew from 
Parliament, and on 15 October, when Filat's immunity was lifted, he self-
suspended from the position of first vice-president of the DPM, when the 
Democratic delegation was holding consultations with President Timofti on 14 
December, Marian Lupu proposed the DPM backer for prime minister. The 
discussion was extremely tense. The following day, the DPM chairman put up 
an interview on infotag.md, threatening Timofti with dismissal:  
 
 “We talked to the president, and there is pressure on him, it is visible, I have 
never seen Mr. Timofti in this state of agitation, and it is extremely obvious that 
someone is applying unacceptable pressure on him, I hope he's not being 
 blackmailed, God forbid!... We shall see to what extent President Timofti is captive, 
how the ones pressing him have taken  captive the presidential institution, because we 
are already discussing a problem of national security”. 
  
 For the first time in almost four years of being in office, President 
Timofti answered through a firm communique categorically rejecting Marian 
Lupu's allegations, adding that, at the discussions on 14 December, the DPM 
insisted that the head of state designate Plakhotniuk as prime minister. Timofti 
met western ambassadors, to whom he complained about the DPM threats.  
In turn, the press in Chișinău started speculating, saying that Timofti 
was being blackmailed by Plakhotniuk with files on his sons, in order to force 
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 Interview with a member in the LDPM leadership (Chișinău, 26 September 2015).  
40  www.platzforma.md/protestele-din-moldova-in-citeva-momente/ (accessed 20 Feb. 2016).  
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him to accept the nomination wanted by the DPM. Timofti's answer was to 
nominate Ion Sturza, former Moldovan politician, who had years before gone to 
Bucharest for business, where he collaborated with Dinu Patriciu41.  
 Plakhotniuk's reaction was swift in coming. The attacks against Timofti 
continued, the Constitutional Court was petitioned, and answered immediately 
that the president has to take into account the majority in Parliament, which can 
at any time be bought and changed. Another front was opened in Parliament, 
where a number of MPs threatened to initiate dismissal procedures against 
President Timofti.  
 In order for things to be even clearer, the controversial oligarch posted 
on social media on 21 December the decision to return to active political life, 
announcing he would “take part directly in forming the parliamentary majority”. 
The result was not late in coming; three days later, 14 communist MPs announced 
they were withdrawing, enlisting in the oligarch's Social Democratic Platform. 
As Plakhotniuk wrote on social media, it was “an important step towards the 
consolidation of a solid parliamentary majority” (posted on 24 December).  
 Far from being unanimously criticized, even though Plakhotniuk's 
public image was very poor, the oligarch's decision to enter politics was saluted 
by some commentators. For instance, Vitalie Sprinceană believed that this 
would legalize the most important part of the Moldovan political and economic 
underground. By keeping outside of formal politics, Plakhotniuk's influence 
rose, providing him with ample room to maneuver, which made him all-
powerful. Sprinceană believes that his entering formal politics would put the 
spotlight on Plakhotniuk, cutting off his feeding tubes from the underground, 
ultimately curbing his influence42.  
 Plakhotniuk's entrance into formal politics caused an explainable 
effervescence on the center right of the political chessboard, on the pro-
European side. On 23rd of December, Maia Sandu announced she would launch 
a civic platform, which would turn into a party, and Ion Sturza was nominated 
by the president for the position of prime minister, saying that from then on he 
would get seriously involved in political life. The two could rather have taken 
over from pro-European leaders tarnished in corruption scandals, replacing 
important chess pieces, which were at that point useless. However, their 
entering the arena did not change the rules of the game. Which is precisely what 
Moldova would have needed, after it became obvious that the political model by 
which it had functioned for over two decades was an abysmal failure. Sandu and 
Sturza fit the pattern centered on charismatic politicians, and not on doctrine, 
values and priorities, and the two did not have homogeneous teams behind 
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 http://www.evz.ro/omul-care-l-a-facut-miliardar-pe-patriciu-810400.html (accessed 4 Jan. 
2016).  
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them. Because of this political model there are no more confrontations of ideas, 
programs, projects, and everything is now personal conflict. In fact, the entire 
political history of Moldova was a long series of “acts of seduction”, followed 
by “disappointment” in political leaders. The popularity of an idea is directly 
dependent on the leader's popularity. This is why today the pro-European 
political orientation is discredited in the eyes of most of the population. 
Precisely because the ones that promoted this project were discredited43.  
 The novelty, otherwise very important, in the year 2015, was popular 
mobilization. It hails back to the Glasnost practices in the late '80s and early 
'90s, when large crowds were protesting in the street. It is the starting point of 
democracy in all the former Soviet republics. The Dignity and Truth Platform, 
in a very hostile environment, managed to bring out to the streets tens of 
thousands of protesters, asking them to get involved, “to take their country 
back”, and to “punish” the people who stole the billion. What remains to get 
done for the Dignity and Truth Platform, born out of the protests and which 
officially registered in February 2016, is for it to consolidate its profile and turn 
the 2015 civic activism into election figures.  
 
 
 President Timofti Kept in Check 
 
 The political crisis in Chișinău entered its decisive phase in the year that 
Plakhotniuk returned to politics. The text was posted on 21 December, a few 
days after President Timofti met western ambassadors and complained about the 
pressure put on him by the DPM. Just like the president, citizen Plakhotniuk 
met “several foreign partners, officials who came to discuss the political 
situation in our country, but also members of the diplomatic corps”, to whom he 
 
 “presented the solutions... [for getting Moldova out of the crisis – A.G emphasis] and I 
was asked why I don't get involved in their implementation, if such situations exist. I 
promised I would get involved, and now the moment has come for me to do it. Starting 
today, I am getting back to the party and I will participate directly in the formation of 
the parliamentary majority that will ensure a stable governance, and which I hope will 
gather the necessary votes to elect the president of the  country in March”.  
 
 The first moves of the oligarch newly returned to politics were: to 
launch the Social Democratic Platform, with the 14 communist defectors, 
creating an offensive apparatus against President Timofti, the last standing in 
the way of Plakhotniuk's political ambitions.  
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 Laying the trap that was supposed to limit the president's freedom of 
movement was accomplished through a decision of the Constitutional Court, 
which practically forced the president to do whatever Plakhotniuk wanted. The 
Constitutional Court in Chișinău is well known for its bizarre decisions, which 
are not just the result of an overheated imagination. For instance, it barred Filat 
from continuing as a premier; it ruled that the independence declaration trumps 
the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova; it declared Romanian the state 
language, even though the Constitution still has Art. 13, which states that the 
official language is Moldovan. Just like analysts in Chișinău had predicted, the 
Constitutional Court, at very high speed, ruled in Plakhotniuk's favor. And, in 
order for things to be clarified as speedily as possible, the chief justice of the 
court, the controversial Alexandru Tănase, explained the ruling on his personal 
blog44, before it had been issued by the justices45. After calling his co-nationals 
stupid for believing in horoscopes, and saying about Moldovans that they have a 
“rudimentary” society, the chief justice, who claims to speak “a slightly more 
elevated Romanian language”, clarified the obscurities in the Constitution:  
 
 “The party which wins in the result [sic] of parliamentary elections a majority 
which allows it to form a  government, or a coalition that forms a majority, proposes 
to the President the name of the Prime Minister”. 
 
 However, the majority constituted in Parliament did not reflect the 
result of the elections, but the level of corruption of politicians, who can be 
blackmailed, bought and manipulated to form majorities that have nothing to do 
with the will of the voters.  
 The clarifications provided by Alexandru Tănase were supposed to 
prepare for President Timofti's second nomination. It was no secret that Ion 
Sturza did not stand a chance to be voted in by Parliament. And this was in spite 
of the fact that Sturza had led the Moldovan government between March and 
November 1999, when the country was closest to the West, had a very good 
image, was an independent politician, was outside the semi-mafioso relations 
between political-criminal groups in Chișinău, was a respected businessman in 
Romania, where he came to reside, was a good manager, and an effective 
communicator. All these details mattered not at all. The treatment to which the 
Sturza team was subjected at the meeting on January 4 is proof of the fact that, 
in Moldova, institutions and procedures are no longer respected, even in form. 
The premier designate was not allowed to submit his governance platform, and 
President Candu said that only 47 MPs were present in the room, out of 101; the 
boycott supposedly meant that “the attempt is considered failed, and the 
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president [Timofti ‒ A.G. emphasis] has to make another proposal for the position 
of premier”. After resuming consultations with political parties and taking into 
consideration the latest clarifications from the Constitutional Court, obviously46.  
 Disappointed with the brutal treatment, Sturza turned in his mandate to 
the president, announced he was retiring from political life, and went back to 
Bucharest. Sturza had barely left Parliament that DPM chairman Lupu 
announced that by 11 January, the Social Democratic Platform would hold the 
simple 51 vote majority to have the government sworn in.  
 The DPM pressure on President Timofti seems to have made him resist 
Plakhotniuk's demands. It had become personal, which made it highly unlikely 
that the nomination of the controversial oligarch for prime minister would be 
accepted. There seemed to be a few things to indicate that: the firm response to 
Lupu's accusations; the meeting with western ambassadors; the New Year 
address to the citizens of the Republic of Moldova47; the statement made after 
the January 5 meeting with the leaders of parliamentary parties, to whom he 
gave a week for negotiations, and asked them to take into account, in forming a 
new coalition, the pro-European leaning of the citizenry, and for the candidates 
proposed for prime minister to “meet the criteria for integrity and not be under 
suspicion of corruption”48.  
 As promised, DPM chairman Marian Lupu submitted a statement on 
January 11 forming a new majority around his party to support Vlad 
Plakhotniuk as a candidate for PM. The document was signed by Lupu, 
Ghimpu, Violeta Ivanova and Ion Bălan. Lupu claimed he was signing on 
behalf of 20 (Democrat) MPs, Ghimpu for 13 Liberals, Ivanova for 15 ex-
communists, and Bălan for 8 (former Liberal Democrats who stayed in the party 
led by Streleț, but who announced their support for Plakhotniuk). The new 
majority numbered 56 deputies. Some commentators pointed out that this new 
majority did not comply with Parliament rules, therefore it was not legitimate. 
However, only Democrats and Liberals make up groups, accounting for 33 
                                                 
46  http://www.dw.com/ro/învestirea-guvernului-sturza-a-eșuat/a-18957906 (accessed 5 Jan. 
2016).  
47  
“The year 2015 proved to us that the natural enthusiasm with which we lived with our 
European achievements, has to turn into concrete action, of restoring health to public 
climate, of eradicating corruption, including political corruption, of eliminating slips and 
shortcomings in society. I am optimistic that it is within our power[s] to reach these 
objectives. You have inspired this confidence in me and I have heard the whisper of the 
people, but then their cries of hope too. The entire political class has to bend its ear to 
you, in order to achieve normalcy, achieve authentic democracy, in which the people is 
sovereign, and its will sacred.” http://presedinte.md/rom/comunicate-de-presa/mesajul-de-
revelion-al-presedintelui-nicolae-timofti (accessed 4 Jan. 2016).  
48  http://presedinte.md/rom/comunicate-de-presa/presedintele-timofti-a-purtat-consultari-
parlamentare (accessed 14 Jan. 2016).  
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deputies, which is no majority. According to the rules, groups form in 10 days 
from Parliament taking office. What Ivanova and Bălan formed can be called 
platforms, but not parliamentary groups, and the ruling of the Constitutional 
Court speaks of parliamentary factions, which make up the majority49. 
Consequently, Violeta Ivanova and Bălan's groups do not count, and therefore 
the declaration of forming a new majority does not apply in their case which 
cancels the Declaration of forming a new majority. Legally, there is a 
declaration of support for Plakhotniuk's candidacy, but not a declaration of 
forming a majority, which is a Constitutional Court requirement, and the 
declaration in support of the oligarch would not have the legal power to obligate 
President Timofti to endorse him as PM.  
 In order to comply with the calendar imposed by Moldovan law, 
President Timofti would have had to nominate the new PM before January 14, 
allowing him to have the 15 days prescribed by law to appoint a new 
government and prepare a platform. The last day for voting in the new 
government was January 29, because that is when three months passed since the 
no-confidence motion against the Streleț government. In the event that this 
calendar had not been complied with, the parties would have had to call for snap 
elections, which would have been a disaster for many. The latest public opinion 
barometer indicated catastrophic figures for parties in Parliament. According to 
a November poll, first place would have been taken by Our Party (Renato 
Usatyi), with 16%, followed by a party that did not exist yet, the Platform for 
Dignity and Truth, organizer of the protests (Andrei Năstase), with 12%, the 
SPRM (Igor Dodon) – 10%, the CPRM (V. Voronin) – 7%, the PPEM (Iurie 
Leancă) – 7%, the DPM (Lupu-Plakhotniuk) – 6%, the LP (M. Ghimpu) – 5%50. 
Given the conditions, it is hard to believe that the MPs were in a hurry to give 
up their privileges and vote against nominating the president and in favor of 
snap elections. The decisive move went to President Timofti, because the 
nominated candidate had infinitely more opportunities to gain, on the second 
attempt try, the necessary vote in Parliament. Hence, the intensified battle 
around the person the president was about to nominate.  
 The president was supposed to decide based on two factors: the ruling 
of the Constitutional Court, dramatically limiting his room for maneuver, and 
the position of Western governments, expressed by their ambassadors in 
Chișinău. Many abuses about to be perpetrated by Moldovan political elites 
have been blocked by Western ambassadors down along the years.  
                                                 
49 
 http://newsmaker/md/rus/kartoteka/vladimir-plahotnyuk-vydvinut-dempartiey-na-post-
premera-eto-bylo-sdelano-zakonno-i (accessed 14 Jan. 2016).  
50  A CBS-AXA poll conducted in February 2015 confirmed the results: Our Party (Usatyi) – 
32%, the Socialist Party (Dodon) – 21%, the Dignity and Truth Party (Năstase) – 13.3%, 
the Action and Solidarity Party (Maia Sandu) – 10%, the Democratic Party (Lupu) – 7%, 
European Populars (Leancă) – 6%.  
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 The opposition opened two fronts. One against Plakhotniuk, saying that 
he did not meet the integrity criteria, as explicitly required by the president at 
the January 5 meeting51 with the parties. It was recalled that Plakhotniuk was on 
a list of people monitored by the Interpol, that the oligarch had defied a British 
court, by moving seized assets. It was recalled that the British press had 
reported how several offshore companies registered in Scotland had been 
involved in the theft of one billion dollars from Moldovan banks, and that those 
same offshore companies had taken part in the financial raids in Moldova in 
2010-2012, whose final beneficiary had been that same Plakhotniuk. Those 
Scottish offshores were also involved in money laundering schemes between 
2012-2014, when $20 billion from Russia got laundered through Moldovan 
courts and banks.  
 The second front the opposition opened was against the MPs who 
joined Plakhotniuk, especially the 7 Liberal-Democrat MPs52. They responded 
publicly with a press release in which they repeated Plakhotniuk's arguments, 
bringing new geopolitical arguments for which they decided to support the 
controversial oligarch:  
 
 “The Republic of Moldova is in an unprecedented crisis... considering the 
geopolitical struggle in the region, the  continuation of this political crisis might bring to 
a halt forever the country's European integration course […] The political parties that 
oppose the European vector and plead for rapid advance towards the East, for 
integrating Moldova into a compromised Customs Union, but also for the federalization 
of the country, wish to throw Moldova right away into snap elections, with the subsequent 
formation of a new anti-European majority. The federalization of the country and the entire 
planned scenario would be a catastrophe for the citizens of our country. Right now we 
believe that the Republic of Moldova needs stability more than ever”53. 
 
 
 Too Much Geopolitics 
 
 Geopolitical arguments are omnipresent in the discourse on the former 
Soviet republic. Bessarabia was annexed by Stalin in the summer of 1940, in 
line with the secret appendices to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, and on 23 
August 1939 its borders were redrawn, and a large part of the territory became 
                                                 
51 
 www.ziarulnational.md/pacatele-lui-plahotniuc-despre-care-tace-lupu/ (accessed 13 Jan. 
2016)  
52  Олигархическая Молдова, Vladimir Hotineanu, Ion Bălan, Ștefan Creangă, Nae-Simion 
Pleșca, Gheorghe Mocanu, Mihaele Spatari, Aliona Goța. http://anticoruptie.md/ 
ro/stiri/pacatele-liberal-democratilor-care-au-anuntat-ca-vor-vota-un-premier-democrat 
(accessed 12 Jan. 2016). 
53  www.zdg.md/stiri-politice-cum-motiveaza-7-deputati-pldm-votul-pentru-un-guvern-pdm 
(accessed 12 Jan. 2016). 
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the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, with another part being annexed by 
Soviet Ukraine. Since everything, or almost everything, is geopolitics, essential 
details on Moldovan society, economy and politics are confined to oblivion. No 
one wants to burden their memory with things they believe insignificant. Hence 
the tragedy of this country, whom no one wants to deal with in seriousness, and 
which progresses only on internal impulses.  
 The veritable propaganda war between these two factions interpret the 
Chisșinău crisis exclusively as a confrontation between the U.S. and Russia. In 
the more sophisticated commentaries, Romania is being attributed a decisive 
role in events in Moldova, due to such a busy agenda in Washington and 
Brussels, occupied with other issues. Romania is supposed to be using this 
context to promote its own interests and people, the most important of them 
being Plakhotniuk. And that comes on top of the fact that he is detested by over 
90% of the population. What, then, is Romania's strategy supposed to be? “The 
worse for Moldova, the better for Romania”54, runs the slogan which pro-
Russian analysts in Chișinău claim is Romania's slogan. According to them, 
Plakhotniuk is Romania's ideal pawn for such a strategy, of pushing the 
Moldovan state to the brink55. Plakhotniuk is supposed to be Bucharest's 
guarantee for a failed Moldovan state, the first step towards a Moldovan and 
Romanian union. That is also the geopolitical explanation supplied by the pro-
Russian analysts when writing that Romania and the U.S. are categorically 
opposed to early elections for the Moldovan Parliament, and therefore against 
democracy. According to polls, these elections would allegedly favor parties 
considered pro-Russian. No one is considering the fact that they may be as pro-
Russian as they are pro-European. In other words, they would be mere vehicles 
for various semi-criminal leaders or groups used to access state resources, as 
has happened so far, while the West-East orientation is simple babble to be sold 
to a humiliated voter base living in the poorest of European countries. 
In fact, geopolitics was utilized cynically by irresponsible Moldovan 
politicians, who were hiding their lack of appetite for reforms by blaming the 
                                                 
54 
 “Чем хуже молдаванам, тем лучше румынам” (Cu cât mai rău pentru moldoveni, cu 
atât mai bine pentru români), Dmitri Chubashenko, “Plahotniuk gotovit blitzkrig is 
<Nobila> v Kondritzu”, http://pan.md/blog/plahotnyuk-gotovit-blitskrig-iz-nobila-v-kondritsu 
(accessed 19 Feb. 2016). 
55  
“Bucharest needs Plakhotniuk in order to definitively kill Modovan statehood, to bring 
everything to full anarchy and disorientation, best of all – to war. Romanian patrons will 
keep Plakhotniuk in power, but will not give Moldova resources for development, limiting 
itself to humanitarian spaghetti instead.” (Бухаресту нужен Плахотнюк, чтобы 
окончательно убить государственность Молдовы, довести все до полной анархии и 
дезориентации, а лучше всего — до войны. Румынские покровители будут 
удерживать Плахотнюка у власти, но не будут давать Молдове ресурсов на 
развитие, ограничившись гуманитарными макаронами”. Ibidem (accessed 19 Feb. 
2016).  
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regional and global context. And why give up these arguments, if they were the 
only ones that could mobilize support in various capitals and unblock loans? 
Just as the Ukrainian political elite, the one in Chișinău worked based on the 
principle “the gentle lamb suckles two sheep”! The country has been swinging 
for over 20 years between Russia and the West, trying to reap maximum 
benefits, especially personal, after bringing the country to the brink of disaster. 
In order to save themselves, Moldovan leaders are invoking the same 
geopolitical considerations, in the hope of tricking someone once again into 
support, this time the West.  
One contribution to the the geopolitical rhetoric manipulation of the 
West is also made by Bucharest, who has a long experience in this game, 
starting as far back as 1964, during the rule of communist leader Gheorghiu-
Dej. For the duration of this crisis, for the Foreign Ministry and the presidency 
in Bucharest, as well as for the majority of politicians, the marching order was 
maintaining at any price the status quo in Chișinău, on the reason that elections 
would bring to power Dodon and Usatyi, who are “strongly and openly” 
supported by Russia56. No dignitary in Bucharest has yet explained if the 
Moldovan elections should get suspended sine die for fear of Russia, or how 
Moscow would help a pro-Russian politician, considering how much trouble 
Russia has with financially supporting the separatist region of Transdnestr.  
 
 
The Compromise that Prolongs the Agony 
 
One day before the deadline for designating the premier, Wednesday, 
January 13, a new round of consultations took place between the president and 
the representatives of the majority group, constituted to support Plakhotniuk in 
his bid to become prime minister. The president rejected the controversial 
oligarch's candidacy, invoking the provisions of the Constitution and the 
Constitutional Court ruling of 22 April 2013, according to which “any political 
mandate has to be based on high integrity standards”, and “it is contrary to the 
principles of the rule of law the appointment to political office of persons over 
whom suspicions of lack of integrity loom”. According to the Moldovan 
presidency, Plakhotniuk “does not meet the integrity criteria necessary for his 
appointment to the position of Prime Minister”, recalling Parliament's decision 
of 15 February 2013, when the oligarch was deposed by no-confidence vote as 
                                                 
56 
 A post on social media from former PM Victor Ponta on 15 January 2016. The former 
SDP leader has long been a supporter of Plakhotniuk's DPM, made official through 
agreements signed at the central headquarters of the SDP in Kiseleff Blvd. Several pieces 
of information coming from Chișinău suggest that Ponta's entire presidential campaign 
was supposed to have been financed by the controversial oligarch.  
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deputy speaker of Parliament, accused of involvement in illegal activities57. 
President Timofti called on the majority to propose a new candidate, meeting 
the integrity criteria, by the following day, Thursday, 14 January, at noon. 
Commentators drew a parallel between Filip, who was not allowed to take up 
the premier seat by ruling of the Constitutional Court, and Plakhotniuk, who 
was deposed for similar reasons.  
The oligarch tried to overcome Timofti's resistance, attacking his 
arguments. Helping him, as on other occasions, was Chief Justice Alexandru 
Tănase, who replied on social media that Filat could have held any position58. 
This was an awkward move on the part of the head justice of the Constitutional 
Court in attempting to help Plakhotniuk, attacking arguments he had offered 
himself in 2013, when he blocked Filat's access to the highest positions in the 
state for integrity reasons. A few hours later, Tănase went back to social media, 
saying that he had not commented on the president's decision59. It was probably 
this intervention that caused Timofti to request individual confirmations for the 
signatures given by the deputies60, on the Declaration that created the new 
majority around the DPM, giving a deadline for 9:00 PM, January 14. This 
latest request by the president seemed as an additional defense line against the 
Plakhotniuk-Tănase tandem. One other ineffective move was the awkward letter 
sent by Plakhotniuk to President Timofti on January 14, in which the oligarch 
tried to assure the president of the “honesty and fairness” of his intentions61. 
Even if appearances were kept up, and institutions seemed to work, the tensions 
in Chișinău had reached a peak, amplified by the rumors about the resignation 
of President Timofti, who categorically refused to designate the oligarch to the 
position of prime minister62. In this state of extreme tension, lacking political 
allies, President Timofti had a telephone conversation with Ion Sturza, who was 
                                                 
57
  http://presedinte.md/rom/comunicate-de-presa/presedintele-nicolae-timofti-respinge-
candidatura-domnului-vladimir-plahotniuc-la-functia-de-prim-ministru (accessed 14 Jan. 
2016).  
58   http://unimedia.info/stiri/tanase--despre-decizia-lui-timofti-de-a-l-respinge-pe-plahotniuc-
107697.html (accessed 14 jan. 2016). 
59  http://unimedia.info/stiri/alexandru-tanase-niciodata-nici--intr-un-context-nu-am-
comentat-decizia-presedintelui-timofti-107706.html (accessed 14 Jan. 2016). Formally, 
this was true, because Tănase had stated that Filat could have taken up any position in the 
state. However, at that point Filat was under arrest, and no one was interested in him. 
However, now commentators had transferred the arguments in the Court ruling of April 
2013 from the Filat case to Plakhotniuk's. Tănase said that Filat could have held any 
position in the state, indirectly saying that Plakhotniuk could as well, therefore President 
Timofti's arguments were not valid.  
60  http://presedinte.md/rom/comunicate-de-presa/presedintele-timofti-solicita-majoritatii-
parlamentare-reconfirmarea-semnaturilor-in-sustinerea-unui-candidat-la-functia-de-prim-
ministru (accessed 14 Jan. 2016).  
61  http://www.realitatea.md/confirmat-plahotniuc-i-a-scris-o-scrisoare-lui-timofti-pentru-a-l-
convinge-sa-l-desemneze-la-func-ia-de-premier-cite-te-aici_32811.html (accessed 14 Jan. 
2016).  
62  Interview with Igor Boțan (Bucharest, February 2016) 
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in Bucharest, deciding to propose him once again as candidate for prime 
minister. In fact, Sturza was getting ready to depart for Chișinău when he heard 
news that Timofti had designated for the position of prime minister Ion 
Păduraru, his chief of staff63. Marian Lupu recalled later that he found out about 
Păduraru's appointment while en route to the president's residence in Condrita, 
with the list of signatures demanded by the president64. In his intervention, 
Timofti said that he had appointed Păduraru because “the coalition did not have 
the necessary number of votes”. From then on, everything depended on the 
deputies. If they did not accept the candidacy, the president reminded them, “we 
have met the premises for early elections, even though I do not want them”65. It 
didn't take long for commentators to recall that Păduraru's name appears in Ilan 
Shor's self-incrimination, the one that led to the arrest of former premier Filat. 
In that document, Păduraru is mentioned as go-between for Le Bridge company 
in its relation to PM Filat, a major vulnerability, especially considering that 
Plakhotniuk controlled the General Prosecutor's Office. Political tensions did 
not dissipate at all with Păduraru's nomination. Friday, January 15 at noon, as 
Sturza told the press, President Timofti was convinced that Păduraru was 
determined to operate reforms, starting to take the country away from oligarchs. 
However, 3 hours and a half later, the president's candidate not only withdrew 
his candidacy, but asked Timofti to consider the candidacy of Pavel Filip, 
proposed by the Plakhotniuk controlled majority66. The president, shortly after, 
nominated for the position of PM Pavel Filip67, the candidate proposed by the 
DPM majority, and Plakhotniuk's associate68.  
                                                 
63 
 http://presedinte.md/rom/comunicate-de-presa/presedintele-timofti-l-a-desemnat-pe-
domnul-ion-paduraru-in-calitate-de-candidat-la-functia-de-prim-ministru (accessed 14 
Jan. 2015)  
64  Marian Lupu told Publika TV: “This is a surprising decision, which we do not understand. 
Not long ago, after discussions with the head of state and the presidency, we, the 
leadership of the DP, were invited to see the president to coordinate another proposal for 
the position of prime minister; halfway there we were informed that the situation had 
changed, and shortly after the decree was issued”, http://presedinte.md/rom/comunicate-
de-presa/presedintele-timofti-l-a-desemnat-pe-domnul-ion-paduraru-in-calitate-de-
candidat-la-functia-de-prim-ministru (accessed 14 Jan. 2015). DPM Chairman Lupu went 
to President Timofti's residence accompanied by Pavel Filip, acting minister of IT and 
Telecom, which was about to be proposed for the position of prime minister.  
65 
 http://presedinte.md/rom/comunicate-de-presa/presedintele-timofti-l-a-desemnat-pe 
domnul-ion-paduraru-in-calitate-de-candidat-la-functia-de-prim-ministru (accessed 14 
Jan. 2015).  
66  http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/nikolae-timofti-obveli-vokrug-kandidata-kak-
bylo-sorvano-povtornoe-vydvizhenie-v-p-21633 (accessed 16 Jan. 2016).  
67 
 http://presedinte.md/rom/comunicate-de-presa/presedintele-timofti-l-a-desemnat-
pe-domnul-pavel-filip-in-calitate-de-candidat-la-functia-de-prim-ministru (accessed 16 
Jan. 2016).  
68  http://jurnal.md/ro/politic/2016/1/15/socor-pavel-filip-este-o-persoana-dintre-cele-mai-
apropiate-ale-lui-vladimir-plahotniuc/ (accessed 16 Jan.2016).  
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 In fact, Filip was among the few who stood by the oligarch during the 
rally held by DPM in downtown Chișinău in support of Plakhotniuk's candidacy 
for PM, on January 13. Not even chairman Lupu or honorary president Dumitru 
Diacov were on the stage, next to Plakhotniuk, on that occasion. But Filip came 
up alongside Plakhotniuk, whom he does business with. Only two names had 
been considered in the DPM, aside from Plakhotniuk: Candu, Speaker of 
Parliament, and Filip, Minister of IT and Telecom.  
 Several commentators said that Păduraru was the weakest link in 
Timofti's entourage, and that the chief of staff of the presidency played for 
Plakhotniuk's team. Păduraru's main mission was to block Sturza's nomination 
for PM. Păduraru is supposed to have convinced Timofti to nominate him, 
persuading him that this move would destabilize Plakhotniuk69. Hence the 
naïveté that made the president assure Sturza that Păduraru would start the fight 
against oligarchs, mere hours before resigning. Pavel Filip's designation was a 
clear victory for Plakhotniuk.  
Faced with heavy opposition from protesters on the streets, the 
president supplied additional explanations:  
 
 “A majority of 55 MPs proposed a candidacy, that of Mr. Pavel Filip, which I 
had to accept, pursuant to the decision issued on 29 December 2015 by the 
Constitutional Court, which, at art. 118, states, quote: ‘there is no constitutional and 
democratic reason for which the President should not designate as candidate for PM the 
person holding a parliamentary majority, be it even in opposition to the President’. 
Beyond all personal opinion, I am obligated, in line with my attributions as president, to 
comply with the country's laws, and, in the present case, the rulings of the 
Constitutional Court”70. 
 
 The president's nomination sparked a new wave of street protests. In 
spite of the bitter cold in Chișinău, tens of thousands took over the central 
square for days. Leading them was a troika of political leaders: the chairman of 
the Socialists, Dodon, the eccentric mayor of Bălți, the head of Our Party, 
Usatyi, and the head of the Platform for Dignity and Truth Party, Năstase. The 
hatred of an impoverished, lied to, and manipulated population, which saw in 
Plakhotniuk the epitome of evil, is the main common link for these three leaders 
and hundreds of thousands of people, brought to the streets in various corners of 
Moldova by despair. All of a sudden, on the streets of Chișinău you could hear 
cries of “Romanian, Russian, Ukrainian, we are all Moldovan!”. In a sense, 
Plakhotniuk managed to create, in a few months, a common platform bringing 
together various Moldovan ethnic groups, traditionally opposed, usually 
                                                 
69 
 Păduraru's reaction to these accusations: http://ziarulnational.md/cum-raspunde-paduraru-
acuzatiilor-ca-l-a-tras-pe-sfoara-pe-timofti-si-a-facut-jocul-pd/ (accessed 17 Jan. 2016).  
70  http://presedinte.md/rom/comunicate-de-presa/declaratie-a-presedintelui-republicii-
moldova-nicolae-timofti (accessed 16 Jan. 2016).  
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artificially so. In fact, Plakhotniuk only brought to life art. 12 of the Democratic 
Party Statute, which “is in favor of the creation and affirmation in the Republic 
of Moldova of the civic nation according to the principle ‘we are all Moldovans 
– citizens of the Republic of Moldova’”71.  
 The last hope for the protest leaders and the tens of thousands out into 
the cold was a visit by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and 
Eurasian Affairs, Victoria Nuland. That the US would intervene in Moldova 
was an illusion, the idea that it would take this country out from under the 
control of oligarch Plakhotniuk. The drama in Chișinău was added to by rumors 
that had persistently circulated in the summer-fall of 2015, according to which, 
Plakhotniuk had negotiated in Washington and Berlin political support in order 
to gain total control of Moldova72. The rumors were so intense that 
commentators, journalists and politicians came to believe them, and were now 
just waiting for confirmation or contradiction of the theory according to which 
the U.S. had sold out Moldova to oligarch Plakhotniuk. According to that same 
theory, Romania was forced by the U.S. to reluctantly support the detested 
oligarch73.  
 On Monday, January 18, Victoria Nuland was in Bucharest, where she 
held talks with Romanian top officials, including about the Moldovan crisis. It 
mattered little that the statements made by the American official were much 
more nuanced, what mattered was an article where the emphasis was on 
stability and support for the Filip government74. The entire Moldovan press, 
both the part controlled by Plakhotniuk75 and the part supporting the opposition, 
Romanian and Russian speaking, carried the same tune: the Americans, the 
State Department, support Plakhotniuk76. This had only increased the confusion 
                                                 
71 
 http://www.pdm.md/ro/pdm/statut (accessed 14 Jan. 2015). Igor Boțan pointed out to me 
this article in the DPM statute.  
72  Interviews with various Moldovan journalists (Chișinău, September-October 2015), 
interviews with Arcadie Barbăroșie, Igor Boțan, Petru Negură (Chișinău, September 
2015).  
73  The networks spreading the rumors, as I personally saw during a number of research visits to 
Chișinău, were sympathetic to Plakhotniuk and the DPM, as well as to Ghimpu and the LP. 
74  http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-20736035-victoria-nuland-despre-situatia-din-
republica-moldova-cel-mai-important-lucru-existe-guvern-puternic-pro-european.htm 
(accessed 18 Jan. 2016). This HotNews piece of news was subsequently taken over by the 
entire Russian language press in Moscow, with titles like: “The USA Supports Oligarch 
Plakhotniuk!”. HotNews is a credible source in Romania.  
75  Roughly 80% of the press in Moldova is controlled by Plakhotniuk. Prime TV, 2 Plus, 
Canal 3, Publika Tv, as well as major radio stations are owned by the oligarch, as part of 
the Dutch off-shore OTIV Prime Media.  
76  Most were news, with the title repeating the names Victoria Nuland and Plakhotniuk. 
There have been somewhat more sophisticated commentaries, abounding in geopolitical 
explanations, attempting to explain the US decision. “Штатный режим: Владимир 
Плахотнюк получил поддержку Вашингтона”, http://newsmaker.md/rus/ 
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regarding the West's intentions towards Moldova, the population of which had 
every reason to feel left to the mercy of the oligarch, in poverty, corruption, 
moral and material decay.  
 The Russian press did not miss the opportunity to criticize Plakhotniuk, 
the oligarch detested by an entire country, but “supported by the State 
Department”77, emphasizing the fact that he is duplicitous to the West, claiming 
to support democracy, but in Moldova's case he is against the snap elections 
desired by the majority of the population, according to polls. Public opinion was 
thus being injected with the idea that Moscow is close to the oppressed 
Moldovan people, suffering as a result of the corruption and nepotism of a pro-
European elite pushing the country towards Brussels. If Russia was with the 
people, America supported the oppressor of the people, Plakhotniuk. Victoria 
Nuland's statements on the need to form a stable government in Chișinău 
confirmed the theory according to which Moldovans were sold out to 
Plakhotniuk, feeding the anti-Western Russian propaganda, and especially the 
anti-American propaganda in Moldova.  
 The “confirmation” that the West supported Plakhotniuk was the 
turning point in the protests in Chișinău. Gradually, the initiative in 
coordinating the street protests – which continued in February and March – 
went to Dodon and Usatyi, who are considered anti-Western, and even pro-
Russian, in the case of the Socialist leader. Dodon and Usatyi went from 
inspiration (from the slogans of the protest movement) on to claim and play a 
more important role in the street protests and influence the protester’s agenda. 
Only the leader of the new pro-European Dignity and Truth Party, Andrei 
Năstase, who started the civic protests in early 2015, seems to keep pace with 
the new political trends. The rest of the parties seem to have lost ground. This 
evolution could be observed at the protests sparked by the almost clandestine 
Parliament session in Chișinău on Wednesday, 20 January, when the Pavel Filip 
government was sworn in within 30 minutes, in defiance of regulations78, 57 
                                                                                                                       
novosti/shtatnyy-rezhim-vladimir-plahotnyuk-poluchil-podderzhku-vashingtona-21687 
(accessed 19 Jan. 2016); Dmitri Chubashenko, “Госдеп оказался бессилньным против 
прущего, кат танк, Плахотнюка”, http://pan.md/blog/formula-pravitelstva-plahotnyuka-
jadnost--strah--repressii-i-degradatsiya (accesed 17 Jan. 2016), issued by several analysis 
or news websites such as http://omg.md/index.php?newsid=11602 (accessed 18 Jan. 
2016).  
77 
 http://pan.md/politika/rossiya-1-plahotnyuk-nachinal-kak-sutener-video (accessed 15 Feb. 
2016). The report on Plakhotniuk is from TV Rossija -1 https://www.youtube.com 
/watch?v=ZNrhEyxqN6o (accessed 15 Feb. 2016).  
78 
 This meeting was short notice, announced only a few hours ahead, which runs against the 
tradition of swearing in meetings. The premier designate, faced with the aggression of the 
Socialist faction in the room, failed to submit its platform, and the customary hearing 
failed being held as well. The session sparked violent protests in Chișinău. 
http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/proteste-violente-la-chisinau-dupa-votul-parlamentului-
48 ARMAND GOȘU 
 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVI  no. 1  2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
votes out of 101. In order to formally comply with the legislation, the members 
of government were secretly taken to President Timofti's residence to get sworn 
in, right before midnight79.  
 Most likely, these protests, violent in certain places, drew attention from 
the West. The visit made by PM Filip to Bucharest, less than a week from 
starting his term, was seen with suspicion by foreign embassies in Chișinău, 
Bucharest and Brussels. The haste with which the Cioloș government was 
willing to loosen purse strings in favor of its Moldovan partner was tempered by 
both President Jean-Claude Junker and Commissioner Johannes Hahn80. Several 
diplomatic sources have confirmed that Brussels called on the Romanian 
government not to hurry in supplying 60 million Euro in loans for Moldova, and 
to wait for the arrival of the IMF delegation to Chișinău and the release of aid 
from Brussels. When Filip visited Bucharest, in addition to making the 
argument for stability, PM Cioloș also talked about ongoing reform. Releasing 
aid for Moldova was conditioned on “a few concrete measures, proving the will 
to reform” on behalf of the Filip government. PM Cioloș promised he would 
make public by the end of the week “a list of several measures the government 
could take before releasing from Bucharest this first installment”. In addition, 
Cioloș continued: “I suggested intense dialog with civil society in the Republic 
of Moldova, with the protesters who want the Republic of Moldova to follow a 
European course”81. That was a cold shower for PM Filip, who did not expect 
such a speech, in flagrant contradiction with everything Romanian institutions 
had, so far, issued officially in terms of Moldova. That was puzzling for the 
press in Chișinău too, as they continued to cover the success of Filip's visit to 
Bucharest and the release of the loan that was going to pay for the December 
and January wages and pensions.   
 A few days later, PM Cioloș wrote a letter to his counterpart in 
Chișinău, laying out the conditions for the loan82. Right in the first few lines, 
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Bucharest reaffirmed support for “civic dialog between authorities and the 
representatives of civil society”, which seems to confirm a shift in attitude 
towards Moldova. Political leaders and civil society in Chișinău were rather 
dismayed by the conditions set by Romania83, which pinned to the end of the 
list the issue of the judiciary, even though the reform of the public prosecutor's 
office and anti-corruption were the main demands from protesters. A few days 
later, the Civic Forum of Moldova, which gathers together representatives of 
civil society, protesters, and opposition and outside Parliament parties, 
submitted a resolution84 on 4 February, with a list of demands, much more to 
the point, in which the emphasis fell more on the functioning of the National 
Bank of Moldova, in order to prevent embezzlement on the level that was 
perpetrated in the three banks, but mostly on the reform of the judiciary and 
fighting corruption85.  
 Brussels stopped being contemplative and letting its relationship to 
Moldova run through Bucharest. The EC published 13 recommendations 
addressed to the Republic of Moldova on 15 February86. They recommended 
reforms for depoliticizing state institutions, combating systemic corruption, 
reforming public administration (par. 4); the serious and impartial investigation 
of banking theft (art. 6); providing for the independence of the judiciary and 
anti-corruption institutions, reforming the public prosecution system and the 
fight against corruption (art. 7), etc. The general impression left is that the 13 
conclusions of the Council are much closer to what the civic and political 
opposition demanded in 2015 from the powers that be in Chișinău than the 
semblance of conditions laid out by the Cioloș government.  
 The parliamentary majority and the Plakhotniuk controlled government 
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have a few urgent issues to deal with. First of all there is the release of the 
loans, without which Moldova risks a financial meltdown. The Chișinău 
government will have to make a few reforms to convince the West of its good 
intentions. So far, what Chișinău brandished as reforms is a long list of 
dismissals of public officials and appointments of people close to Plakhotniuk, 
as well as passing a few laws with bizarre provisions introduced at the last 
moment. Rather hard to persuade the West with such meager fodder. The IMF 
and the EU are less lenient than the government in Bucharest, and will demand 
from the Filip government something more substantial than vague promises. In 
turn, the government run by Cioloș, made up of people dreaming of returning to 
Brussels, to work for the EC or the European External Action Service, for 
thousands of Euros in salaries, will not contradict the Commission in order to 
fund Chișinău. These people will not ruin the relationships they have built in 
Brussels for the sake of more obscure arrangements made by who knows who 
or why. The short circuiting of the relationship between Bucharest and Chișinău 
by Brussels and Washington seems a fact that bears confirming. The moment of 
attention that Chișinău enjoyed on behalf of the violent protests that marked the 
investiture of the Filip government could be fast replaced by a lack of interest. 
The regional instability may be an advantage for the opposition, but so far the 
Ukrainian crisis has been put to better use by the Plakhotniuk faction, which 
threatens the West with the setting up in Parliament a pro-Russian majority in 
case of early elections.  
 The most important political test for the majority built around the DPM 
comes in a few weeks, when Timofti's term expires. Most commentators in 
Chișinău believe that Plakhotniuk holds 61 votes towards becoming president. 
However, there are two problems facing him: street protests, which could 
escalate, throwing Moldova into chaos; and foreign governments, aware that 
Plakhotniuk as a president could mean an official takeover of power by criminal 
elements of post-Soviet origin.  
 After failing in becoming PM, Plakhotniuk could be forced into the 
underground of politics, promoting as president a close associate, such as Pavel 
Filip was. One name intensely circulated is that of Monica Babiuc, Minister of 
Culture, member of the DPM, and a close associate of Plakhotniuk. Any real 
reform in Moldova is a direct threat to the control that Plakhotniuk wields over 
various institutions. Since the West has a lot to deal with (refugees, the UK 
referendum, extending sanctions against Russia, the Ukrainian crisis, the 
tensions between Russia and Turkey, the Syrian crisis, etc), after securing the 
release of loans to Moldova and getting through the issue of selecting the 
president, Moldova may not enjoy such much attention. Therefore, the people in 
power in Chișinău will give up miming reforms and will try to push for an 
authoritarian political regime. Moldova, however, is not Belarus, not even 
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Armenia. It is much more influenced by the West, and has a different dominant 
political culture.  
 Early elections are still the only solutions for taking the country out of 
the political crisis it has been mired in. The more they are delayed, the more the 
chances of a victory for a pro-Russian and anti-European faction taking power 
will grow. By granting loans, even on condition, the West is buying time. 
Ideally, during these months the new pro-European parties such as the Dignity 
and Truth Platform led by Andrei Năstase, or the Action and Solidarity Party 
led by Maia Sandu, could end up offering the Moldovan voters a plausible pro-
European alternative. Early elections, which now seem improbable, could 
become not only probable, but even desirable by fall, on condition the present 
parliamentary majority and the Filip government do not achieve reform, 
calming tensions by dialog with the opposition and civil society.  
